Let the timing be such that:1. The union makes a single wage demand, w, that applies to all the firms;2. The firms observe and accept (they have to) w, and then simultaneously choose how many workers to hire, L_i for firm i.3. Payoff is (W-W_a)L for the union, where L=L_1+L_2+?+L_N is the total number of workers hired,w_a is the wage the union members can earn in alternative employment; The payoff for firm i is Pi_i, which is determined in a Cournot setting where P=a-Q, where Q=q_1+q_2+?+q_n. Output equals labor: q_i=L_i. For simplicity suppose firms have no costs other than wages .Find the subgame perfect outcome of this game. How does the number of firms (N) affect the union?s payoff?